In Africacrypt 2009, Galindo-Garcia [GG09] proposed a lightweight identity-based signature (IBS) scheme based on the Schnorr signature. The construction is simple and claimed to be the most efficient IBS till date. The security is based on the discrete-log assumption and the security argument consists of two reductions: B 1 and B 2 , both of which use the multiple-forking lemma [BPW12] to solve the discrete-log problem (DLP).
Introduction
The notion of identity-based signatures (IBS) is an extension of the idea of digital signatures to the identity-based setting. As in traditional signature schemes, the signer uses her secret key to sign a message. However, the signature can be verified by anyone using the signer's identity and public parameters of the private-key generator (PKG). IBS or more generally, identitybased cryptosystems [Sha85] do not require any certificates to be exchanged and hence can be advantageous over the traditional PKI based systems in certain scenarios.
Several RSA based IBS [FS87, GQ90] have been proposed in the literature after the notion of IBS was introduced by Shamir in 1984 [Sha85] . In recent times, a few pairing based constructions were also proposed [CHC02, Her05, Hes03, DSVPR11] . Galindo-Garcia [GG09] , on the other hand, used the technique of concatenated Schnorr's signature to propose an identity-based signature that works in the discrete-log setting but does not require pairing. The authors came up with a security proof of the proposed IBS scheme in the so-called EU-ID-CMA model (see Appendix A.2) using the random oracle methodology [BR93] and a variant of the forking lemma [BN06, BPW12, PS00] . The security is based on the discrete-log problem in any prime order group. The authors suggest to implement their scheme in a suitable elliptic curve group and after a comparative study concluded that the proposed construction has an overall better performance than the existing RSA-based and pairing-based schemes. The Galindo-Garcia IBS, due to its efficiency and simplicity, has been used as a building block for a couple of other cryptosystems [RS11, XW12] .
Our Contribution. Critical examination of the security argument of a cryptographic construction to see whether the claimed security is indeed achieved or not is an important topic in cryptographic research. Two such well-known examples are Shoup's work on OAEP [Sho01] and Galindo's work on Boneh-Franklin IBE [Gal05] . Another important question in the area of provable security is to obtain tighter security reduction for existing construction. One such classical example is Coron's analysis of FDH [Cor00] . In this work we revisit the security argument of Galindo-Garcia IBS [GG09] with the above two questions in mind.
The security argument of Galindo-Garcia IBS consists of two reductions, B 1 and B 2 , the choice of which is determined by an event E. The authors construct B 1 to solve the DLP when the event E occurs. Similarly, B 2 is used to solve the DLP in case the complement of E occurs. Both the reductions use the multiple-forking lemma [BPW12] to show that the DLP is reduced to breaking the IBS scheme.
In this work, we make several observations about the security argument in [GG09] . In particular, we show that the reduction B 1 fails to provide a proper simulation of the unforgeability game in the standard security model for IBS [BNN04] , while B 2 is incomplete. We adopt a twopronged approach to address these problems. First, we sketch ways to fill the gaps by making minimal changes to the structure of original security argument; then, we provide a new security argument. The new argument consists of three reductions: R 1 , R 2 and R 3 . At a high level, our first reduction, R 1 , addresses the problems identified in the original B 1 in [GG09] , while R 2 and R 3 together address the incompleteness of the original B 2 . The reduction R 1 uses the general forking lemma [BN06] and the technique first introduced by Coron [Cor00] to prove the security of FDH. We show that this results in a significantly tighter security reduction. On the other hand, both R 2 and R 3 are structurally similar to B 2 but uses two different versions of the multiple forking lemma [BPW12] , together with an algebraic technique similar to one adopted by Boneh-Boyen in [BB04] . The security reduction R 2 is also significantly tighter than the original B 2 (see Table 1 for a comparison). All the three reductions use the programmability of the random oracles in a crucial way.
Notations. We adopt the notations commonly used in the literature. In addition, the symbol < is used to order the random oracle calls; e.g., H(x) < G(y) indicates that the random oracle call H(x) precedes the random oracle call G(y). More generally, H < G indicates that the target H-oracle call precedes the target G-oracle call. Finally, Z + denotes the set of positive integers.
Forking Lemma
Pointcheval-Stern introduced the forking lemma [PS00] to prove the security of a number of signature schemes. In this section, we describe two variants of the original forking lemma: the general forking lemma [BN06] and the multiple-forking lemma [BPW12] . The general forking lemma was proposed by Bellare-Neven as an abstraction of the forking lemma. The forking lemma is explained in terms of signatures and adversaries, whereas the general forking lemma focusses on algorithms and their outputs. But, in the general forking algorithm, only one random oracle is involved in the so called oracle replay attack. The multiple-forking algorithm extends the oracle replay attack to involve two random oracles and multiple replay attacks.
General Forking Lemma
We first reproduce the general forking algorithm from [BN06] and then explain its working. This is followed by the statement of general forking lemma.
General Forking Algorithm. Fix q ∈ Z + and a set S such that |S| ≥ 2. Let W be a randomised algorithm that on input a string x and elements s 1 , . . . , s q ∈ S returns a pair (I, σ) consisting of an integer 0 ≤ I ≤ q and a string σ. The forking algorithm F W associated to W is defined as Algorithm 1 below.
Pick coins ρ for W at random
Lemma 1 (General Forking Lemma [BN06] ). Let G I be a randomised algorithm that takes no input and returns a string. Let
Multiple-Forking Lemma
We first reproduce the multiple-forking algorithm from [BPW12] , followed by the statement of multiple-forking lemma.
The Multiple-Forking Algorithm. Fix q ∈ Z + and a set S such that |S| ≥ 2. Let W be a randomised algorithm that on input a string x and elements s 1 , . . . , s q ∈ S returns a triple (I, J, σ) consisting of two integers 0 ≤ J < I ≤ q and a string σ. Let n ≥ 1 be an odd integer. The multiple-forking algorithm M W ,n associated to W and n is defined as Algorithm 2 below.
Lemma 2 (Multiple-Forking Lemma [BPW12] ). Let G I be a randomised algorithm that takes no input and returns a string. Let acc := Pr
3 Revisiting the Galindo-Garcia Security Argument
We first reproduce the construction of GG-IBS and then identify several problems with the original security argument in [GG09] .
The Construction
The scheme is based on the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch91] discussed in the previous chapter. The user secret key can be considered as the Schnorr signature by the PKG on the identity of the user, using the master secret key as the signing key. Analogously, the signature on a message by a user is the Schnorr signature, by that user, on the message using her user secret key as the signing key. The construction is given below (for further details see [GG09, §3] ).
Set-up, G (κ): Generate a group G = g of prime order p. Select z ∈ R Z p and set Z = g z . Return z as the master secret key msk and (G, p, g, Z, H, G) as the master public key mpk, where H and G are hash functions
Key Extraction, E (id, msk): Select r ∈ R Z p and set R := g r . Return usk := (y, R) ∈ Z p × G as the user secret key, where y := r + zc and c := H(R, id).
Signing, S (id, m, usk): Let usk = (y, R) and c = H(R, id). Select a ∈ R Z p and set A := g a . Return σ := (b, R, A) ∈ G × Z p × G as the signature, where Remark 1. Note that, although R is a part of the secret key of a user it is actually public information. In fact, R also forms a part of the signatures given by that user. Hence, by construction, all signatures generated using the user secret key usk = (y, R) will contain the same R. This also means that, in the security argument, the simulator has to maintain the same R for a particular user; otherwise, the simulation will diverge from the actual protocol execution.
The Security Argument and Problems with it
The original security argument involves the construction of two algorithms B 1 and B 2 for complementary events E and NE respectively. E is the event that the attempted forgeryσ = (Â,b,R) is valid, non-trivial andR is contained in the response to some query to the signature oracle.
The event E (and its complement NE) is defined in this particular way in order to guarantee that the forgeries are in a format that helps the respective reductions to solve the DLP challenge. In reduction B 2 , the problem instance is embedded as a part of the master public key and hence the master secret key is not known to B 2 . The extract queries are answered by using an algebraic technique similar to the one in [BB04] . The signature queries, on the other hand, are answered by invoking the signing algorithm S after the user secret key has been generated as in the extract query. Finally, B 2 uses the MF Algorithm M W ,3 to obtain four related forgeries and uses these forgeries to solve the DLP challenge.
On the other hand, the strategy adopted in B 1 is quite different from B 2 . The central idea is to embed the problem instance in the randomiser R while choosing its own master keys. In the simulation, B 1 randomly chooses one of the identities involved in G-oracle query as the target identity. For signature queries involving this target identity, B 1 embeds the problem instance in R and then uses the aforementioned algebraic technique to give the signature. The circularity involved is resolved by programming the random oracles. If A makes an extract query on the target identity, B 1 fails; for all other identities, B 1 uses the knowledge of the master secret key to respond to the queries. Finally it hopes that A returns a forgery containing R (in which the problem instance is embedded). In order to solve the DLP, B 1 needs to obtain two such forgeries. This is accomplished with the help of the MF Algorithm M W ,1 .
The original argument. We now reproduce the original reductions from [GG09, §4] using our notation (for ease of reference, the bullets are replaced by numeric values). Each reduction is followed, immediately, by the observations that cause its failure. In the following, B i .j refers to the j th step in the construction of B i , i ∈ {1, 2}. (Some of the "typos" in the original security argument, that were corrected, are mentioned in the footnotes.)
Let A be an adversary against GG-IBS in the EU-ID-CMA model. Eventually, A outputs an attempted forgery of the form σ = (A, B, R). Let E be the event that σ is a valid signature and R was contained in an answer of the signature oracle O s . Let NE be the event that σ is a valid signature and R was never part of an answer of O s . Galindo and Garcia construct an algorithm B 1 [resp. B 2 ] that breaks the DLP in case of event E [resp. NE].
3.2.1 Reduction B 1 B 1 takes as argument the description of a group (G, p, g) and a challenge g α with α ∈ R Z p and tries to extract the discrete logarithm α. The protocol environment is simulated as shown below. 
Then it returns the signature (A, B, R) to A.
Here algorithm W is simply a wrapper that takes as explicit input, the answers from the random oracles. Then it calls A and returns its output together with two integers I, J. These integers are the indices of A's queries to the random oracles G, H with the target identitŷ id.
1 In the original reduction, c was set to H(îd, g α ) instead of H(îd, R). This is most likely a typo as it leads to the signatures onîd fundamentally failing the verification.
2 Here, d is not assigned a value, though from the protocol we may infer that d := G(id, A, m). But this leads to a circularity as the value of A depends on d. To avoid this circularity, B 1 has to program G-oracle as follows:
In this way we get two forgeries of the form σ 0 = (id, m, (A, B 0 , R)) and σ 1 = (id, m, (A, B 1 , R)). . If the identity id is not equal to the target identitŷ id then B 1 aborts. Otherwise it terminates and outputs the attempted discrete logarithm
Observations on B 1 . We now note the following points about the reduction B 1 given above. We also mention ways to fix the problems.
Observation 1 (Correctness of signatures onîd). In B 1 .4, when A makes a signature query onîd, B 1 returns (A, B, R) ∈ G 3 as the signature. However, in the protocol definition, the signatures are elements of G × Z p × G. Therefore, the signatures onîd will fail the verification in the general group setup-i.e., G is any cyclic group of prime order p, and in particular, in the elliptic curve setting-as the operation g B is not defined in G.
What the authors could have intended in B 1 .4 is
Even after the above correction is applied, the signatures onîd fail the verification algorithm.
For the signatures to verify, the following equality should hold.
It is easy to check that the LHS in (3) is a random element of Z p . Hence, the signatures onîd given by B 1 will fail to verify with an overwhelming probability of 1 − 1/p. The equality holds if we set t := 1 + zc/α, instead of selecting t uniformly at random from Z p . 3 However, setting t := 1 + zc/α results in R being set to the problem instance g α , removing t from the picture altogether. Thus, B 1 .4 would finally look like:
• When A queries the signature oracle O s with (id, m) where id =îd, Although it may appear that the reduction B 1 can be rescued with the modification mentioned above, the line of argument in B 1 has another inherent-much more serious-problem, which we describe next.
Observation 2 (Ambiguity due to the choice ofîd). B 1 sets the identity involved in theî th G-oracle query as the target identityîd (see B 1 .1). Hence, the target identity can be fixed only after theî th query to the G-oracle has been made. However, whenever a signature query is made on any identity, B 1 has to decide whether the identity is the target identity or not. Therefore, when A makes a signature query before theî th G-oracle query, B 1 has no way to decide whether to proceed to B 1 .3 or B 1 .4 (as it depends on whether id =îd or not).
B 1 can provide a proper simulation of the protocol environment only if no signature query is made on the target identityîd before theî th G-oracle query. However, B 1 cannot really restrict the adversarial strategy this way. In fact, B 1 will fail to give a proper simulation of the protocol environment if A makes one signature query onîd before theî th G-oracle query and one more signature query onîd after theî th G-oracle query. One way to fix the problem noted above is to guess the "index" of the target identity instead of guessing the target G-index. Suppose n distinct identities are involved in the queries to the G-oracle, where 1 ≤ n ≤ q G . 4 The strategy would be to guess the indexî of the target identitŷ id among all the identities, i.e. if {id 1 , . . . , id n } were the distinct identities involved in the queries to the G-oracle (in that order), we set idî with 1 ≤î ≤ n as the target identity. Now, by assumption no identity queried to the G-oracle prior to idî can be the target identity. Hence, the ambiguity noted before can be avoided. Although this strategy works well with the "mended" reduction that we ended up in Observation 1, it will still incur a tightness loss of the order O q 3 G . In our alternative security argument given in §4, we show how to get around the problem in B 1 by using Coron's technique, together with some algebraic manipulation and non-trivial random oracle programming. In addition to correcting the errors in B 1 , we end up with a much tighter reduction as a result.
Reduction B 2
It takes as argument, the description of a group (G, p, g) and a challenge g α with α ∈ R Z p and outputs the discrete logarithm α. To do so, it will run A simulating the environment as shown below.
B 2 .1 At the beginning of the experiment, B 2 sets the master public key mpk:=(G, p, g, G, H) and msk := (g α ), where G, H are description of hash functions modelled as random oracles. As usual, B 2 simulates these oracles with the help of two tables L G and L H containing the queried values together with the answers given to A. B 2 .2 Every time A queries the key extraction oracle O ε , for user id, B 2 chooses c, y ∈ R Z p , sets R := g −αc g y and adds R, id, c to the . In this way either B 2 aborts prematurely or we get, for some identity id, some message m and some R, four forgeries (id, m, (A k , b k , R)) 5 , k := 0, . . . , 3 with A 0 = A 1 and A 2 = A 3 . As all these signatures are valid, the following equations hold.
Observations on B 2 . We now note the following points about the reduction B 2 given above.
As in B 1 , we discuss possible fixes.
Observation 3 (Incorrect solution of the DLP instance.). In
Step B 2 .4, the reduction obtains the solution of the DLP instance by solving the four equations given in (4). However, on substituting the values of b k s from (4) in (5) we get
which is not the correct solution to the DLP instance.
Note that the simulator does not know the value of log g R and hence cannot extract α from the above expression. However, it is not difficult to get the correct solution (as we show in (14) of §4.3). The more fundamental problem is that B 2 fails to capture all possible adversarial strategies as we show next.
Observation 4 (Incompleteness of B 2 .). In Step B 2 .4, B 2 invokes M W ,3 to get four forged signatures with b k s as given in (4). The b k component of the forged signatures, though, need not always have this particular structure.
The structure depends on the precise order in which A makes the target oracle queries G(id, A, m) and H(R, id) during the simulation. (Here, (id, m) corresponds to the target identity and the message pair in the forgery while (A, R) are components of the forged signature.) Thus, (4) covers only one of the two possible adversarial behaviours: A querying the random oracles in the logical order H < G 6 (shown in Figure 5 where the first branching corresponds to the forking of the H-oracle). But one cannot rule out the complementary case of G < H: A querying the G-oracle before the H-oracle (see Figure 2) where the first branching corresponds to the forking of the G-oracle. 7 Let's look into the structure of the forged signatures in the case G < H. As a result of the ordering of the oracle queries, W returns J 0 as the index of the G-oracle query on (id, A, m) and I 0 as the index of the H-oracle query on (R 0 , id), at the end of round 0. As G-oracle is forked before the H-oracle, we get
in the subsequent forkings, while all the c i , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3 will be different. On the other
Figure 2: Structure of the forgeries in the case G < H. Q 0
hand, the value A returned as part of the forged signature remains the same in all the four rounds. Hence, the signatures returned by M W ,3 will contain b k s of the form:
When the signatures have the structure as in (7), we cannot use (5) (more precisely, the corrected version as given in (14) of §4.3) to get a solution of the DLP. This is because d 1 = d 0 and d 3 = d 2 makes the denominator part in the corresponding expression zero. As we cannot rule out this particular adversary, the reduction does not address all the cases, rendering it incomplete. To summarize, the same strategy to solve the DLP will not work for the two aforementioned complementary cases. Still it is possible to distinguish between the two cases (H < G and G < H) simply by looking at the structure of the forged signatures. In the case H < G, all the Rs will be equal, i.e. R 3 = R 2 = R 1 = R 0 ; as for G < H, all the As will be equal, i.e. A 3 = A 2 = A 1 = A 0 . We could then use appropriate relations 8 to solve for the DLP instance. However, this results in an unnecessary forking (the branch consisting of round 2 and round 3 in Figure 2 ) being carried out in the case G < H. We address this in §4 by splitting B 2 into two reductions R 2 and R 3 , with R 2 involving only a single forking. The single forking, in turn, leads to a tighter reduction (see Table 1 ).
New Security Argument
On the basis of the observations made in the previous section, we now proceed to provide a detailed security argument for GG-IBS. In a nutshell, we have effectively modularised the security argument into three mutually exclusive parts so that each of the three situations mentioned in the previous section can be studied in more detail. We also show that it is possible to obtain tighter reductions in two of the three cases.
In order to address the problem in B 1 we redefine the event E and to address the incompleteness of B 2 we introduce another event F. The security argument involves constructing three algorithms: R 1 , R 2 and R 3 and in each of them solving the DLP is reduced to breaking the IBS. R 1 , unlike its counterpart B 1 , uses the GF Algorithm, whereas R 2 and R 3 , the counterparts of B 2 , still use the MF algorithm. The new reductions R 1 and R 2 are also tighter than their counterparts in the original argument. We also use wrappers in all the three reductions. Argument. A is successful if it produces a valid forgeryσ = (Â,b,R) on (îd,m). Consider the following event 9 in the case that A is successful.
E: A makes at least one signature query onîd andR was returned by the simulator as part of the output to a signature query onîd.
The complement of this event is
¬E: Either A does not any make signature query onîd orR was never returned by the simulator as part of the output to a signature query onîd.
In order to come up with the forgeryσ with a non-negligible probability, the adversary, at some juncture during its simulation, has to make the two random oracle queries: H(R,îd) and G(îd,Â,m). Depending on the order in which A makes these calls, we further subdivide the event ¬E into an event F and its complementary event ¬F, where
The event that A makes the oracle query G(îd,Â,m) before the oracle query H(R,îd) (G < H).
¬F:
The event that A makes the oracle query H(R,îd) before the oracle query G(îd,Â,m) (H < G).
In the case of the events E, ¬E ∧ F and ¬E ∧ ¬F, we give the reductions R 1 , R 2 and R 3 respectively. They are described in the subsequent sections.
Simulating the random oracles. A random oracle query is defined to be fresh if it is the first query involving that particular input. If a query is not fresh for an input, in order to maintain consistency, the random oracle has to respond with the same output as in the previous query on that input. We say that a fresh query does not require programming if the simulator can simply return a random value as the response. The crux of most security arguments involving random oracles, including ours, is the way the simulator answers the queries that require programming. In our case, random oracle programming is used to resolve the circularity involved while dealing with the implicit random oracle queries. A random oracle query is said to be implicit if it is not an explicit query by the adversary or the simulator. As usual, to simplify the book-keeping, all implicit random oracle queries involved in answering the extract and signature queries are put into the account of A.
Reduction R 1
Let ∆ := (G, p, g, g α ) be the given DLP instance. The reduction involves invoking the GF Algorithm on a wrapper Y as shown in Algorithm 4. As a result, it obtains a set of two congruences in two unknowns and solves for α. It can be verified, as we do later, that R 1 indeed returns the correct solution to the DLP instance. The novelty in the design of Y lies in the way the problem instance is embedded in the randomiser R instead of the master public key-R 1 generates its own master keys.
Algorithm 4 Reduction R 1 (∆)
Select z ∈ R Z * p as the msk and set mpk :
The Wrapper
The main ingredient is the so-called "partitioning strategy", first used by Coron in the security argument of FDH [Cor00] . The basic idea is to divide the identity-space I into two disjoint sets, I ε and I s , depending upon the outcome of a biased coin. Y is equipped to respond to both extract and signature queries on identities from I ε . But it fails if the adversary does an extract query on any identity from I s ; it can answer only to signature queries on identities from I s . The problem instance is embedded in the randomiser R, depending on the outcome of the biased coin. As Y maintains a unique R for each identity, the structure of R decides whether that identity belongs to I ε or to I s . The optimal size of the sets is determined on analysis. The details follow.
Suppose that q := q G and S := Z p . Y takes as input the master keys (mpk,msk), the problem instance g α and {s 1 , . . . , s q }. It returns a pair (I, σ) where I is the target G-index and σ is the side-output. In order to track the index of the current G-oracle query, Y maintains a counter , initially set to 1. It also maintains a table L H [resp. L G ] to manage the random oracle H [resp. G]. Y initiates the EU-ID-CMA game by passing mpk as the challenge master public key to the adversary A. The queries by A are handled as per the following specifications. 
Here, (R, id) is the query to the H-oracle and c is the corresponding output. Therefore, a query H(R, id) is fresh if there exists no tuple
If such a tuple exists, then the oracle has to return the corresponding c i as the output.
The r-field is used to store additional information related to the R-field. The tuples corresponding to the explicit H-oracle queries, made by A, are tracked by storing '⊥' in the r-field. This indicates that Y does not have any additional information regarding R. In these tuples, the β-field is irrelevant and this is indicated by storing 'φ'. In tuples with r = ⊥, the β-field indicates whether the DLP instance is embedded in R or not. If β = 0 then R = (g α ) r for some known r ∈ Z p , which is stored in the r-field. On the other hand, β = 1 implies R = g r for some known r ∈ Z p , which is, again, stored in the r-field. We now explain how the fresh H-oracle queries are handled. The query may be (i) H 1 , Explicit query made by A: In this case Y returns c ∈ R Z p as the output. R, id, c, ⊥, φ is added to L H .
(ii) H 2 , Explicit query made by Y : As in the previous case, Y returns c ∈ R Z p as the output. As Y knows r = log g R, R, id, c, r, 1 is added to L H . 
Here, (id, A, m) is the query to the G-oracle and d is the corresponding output. The index of the query is stored in the -field. Therefore, a random oracle query G(id, A, m) is fresh if there exists no tuple
If such a tuple exists, then the oracle has to return the corresponding d i as the output. We now explain how the fresh G-oracle queries are handled. The query may be 
If such a tuple exists, Y checks for the value of β i in the tuple. β i = 0 implies the identity belongs to I s and consequently the extract query fails, leading to Y aborting the simulation: abort 1,1 . On the other hand, β i = 1 implies that there was a prior extract query on id and also that the identity belongs to I ε . Y generates the user secret key (same as in prior extract query) using the information available in the tuple. On the other hand, if such a tuple does not exist, Y selects a fresh r and assigns id to I ε . Y has this freedom since the adversary cannot forge on this identity. A more formal description follows. 
If there exists a tuple
If such a tuple exists, the identity has been assigned to either of I ε or I s , determined by the value of β i . If such a tuple does not exist, then the identity is unassigned and Y assigns the identity to either I ε or I s by tossing a (biased) coin β. If the outcome is 0, id is assigned to I s ; else it is assigned to I ε . Identities assigned to I s have the problem instance g α embedded in the randomiser R. Although the private key cannot be calculated, an algebraic technique, similar to one adopted by Boneh-Boyen in [BB04] , coupled with random oracle programming enables us to give the signature. On the other hand, signature queries involving identities from I ε are answered by first generating usk as in Extract query and then invoking S . A more formal description follows. Correctness of the signatures. For β = 1, the signatures are generated as in the protocol and hence they fundamentally verify. For β = 0, the signature given by Y is of the form (A, b, R), where A = g s (g α ) −rd , b = s + zcd and R = (g α ) r . Y also sets c := H(R, id) and d := G(id, A, m). As a result, the signature verifies as shown below.
At the end of the simulation, a successful adversary forgesσ := (Â,b,R) on (îd,m). Let R j , id j , c j , r j , β j be the tuple in L H that corresponds to the target H-query. Similarly, let id i , A i , m i , d i , i be the tuple in L G that corresponds to the target G-query. Y returns ( i , (b, c j , r j , β j , d i )) as its own output. Note that the side-output σ consists of (b, c j , r j , β j , d i ).
That concludes the description of the wrapper.
Correctness of the Discrete-Log.
In the event of successful forking, R 1 obtains two (related) sets of side-outputs σ 0 and σ 1 , where
It aborts in the event that β 1 = β 0 = 1 (abort 1,3 ). In the rest of the cases, we claim that R 1 ends up with a system of two congruences in two unknowns {â, α}. In the following discussion, letâ denote log gÂ1 = log gÂ0 .
(i) (β 0 = 1) ∧ (β 1 = 0): In this case,R 0 = g r 0 whileR 1 is of the form g r 1 α . As a result, we have {b 0 =â + (r 0 + zc 0 )d 0 ,b 1 =â + (r 1 α + zc 1 )d 1 }-a system of two congruences in the two unknowns {â, α}. α can be solved for as shown below.
In this case,R 0 is of the form g r 0 α whileR 1 = g r 1 . As a result, we have {b 0 =â + (r 0 α + zc 0 )d 0 ,b 1 =â + (r 1 + zc 1 )d 1 }. α can be solved for as shown below.
(iii) (β 0 = β 1 = 0): In this case,R 0 is of the form g r 0 α andR 1 is also of the form g r 1 α . As a result, we have {b 0 =â + (r 0 α + zc 0 )d 0 ,b 1 =â + (r 1 α + zc 1 )d 1 }. α can be solved for as shown below.
Notice that (8), (9) and (10) is precisely what R 1 outputs in Algorithm 4.
Remark 2. The equations (8), (9) and (10) hold even ifR 1 =R 0 (and consequently r j = r i and c j = c i ). Note that this can happen if the adversary makes the random oracle query H(R 0 ,îd) before the query G(îd,Â,m) (H < G) in round 0. Hence, the order in which A makes the aforementioned random oracle queries is not relevant.
Analysis
The probability analysis is governed by the three events abort 1,1 , abort 1,2 and abort 1,3 . First, let's focus on the probability with which the wrapper Y successfully produces an output-the accepting probability acc Y .
The accepting probability. Y aborts the simulation only when A does an extract query on an identity from I s , i.e. an identity with β = 0. Therefore, Y does not abort if all the extract queries correspond to identities from I ε , and consequently Pr ¬abort 1,1 = (1 − δ) qε . Y accepts if the adversary produces a valid (non-trivial) forgery at the end of a successful simulation.
The reduction is successful in the event that neither abort 1,2 and abort 1,3 occurs. The first of the aborts (abort 1,2 ) pertains to the GF Algorithm: R 1 aborts in the event that the forking ended up being a failure. On applying the GF Lemma (Lemma 1) with acc = acc Y , |S| = p and q = q G , we get the following lower bound:
The probability of event abort 1,3 , on the other hand, is the same as that with which (β i = 1) ∧ (β j = 1), i.e. Pr abort 1,3 | ¬abort 1,2 = (1 − δ) 2 . On putting it all together, we get
Assuming p 1, (11) attains maximum value at the point δ = 1 − q ε /(q ε + 1) , at which
Here, exp is the base of natural logarithm.
Remark 3. The above reduction is tighter than the original reduction B 1 given in [GG09] . This can be attributed to two reasons: i) R 1 uses the GF Algorithm F W instead of the MF Algorithm M W ,1 ; and ii) B 1 in [GG09] randomly chooses one of the identities involved in the G-oracle query as the target identity (refer to §3.2.1) which contributes a factor of q 2 G to the degradation in B 1 . By contrast, we apply Coron's technique in R 1 to partition the identity space in an optimal way.
Time complexity. If τ is the time taken for an exponentiation in G, then the time taken by R 1 is t 1 ≤ t + 2(q ε + 3q s )τ . It takes at most one exponentiation for answering the extract query and three exponentiations for answering the signature query. This contributes the (q ε + 3q s )τ factor in the running time. The factor of two comes from the forking algorithm, since it involves running the adversary twice.
Reduction R 2
Let ∆ := (G, p, g, g α ) be the given DLP instance. The reduction involves invoking the MF Algorithm on the wrapper W as shown in Algorithm 5. As a result, it obtains a set of two congruences in two unknowns and solves for α. It can be verified that R 2 indeed returns the correct solution to the DLP instance. The design of the wrapper W follows.
The Wrapper Suppose that q := q H + q G and S := Z p . W takes as input the master public key mpk and {s 1 , . . . , s q }. It returns a triple (I, J, σ) where J [resp. I] is the target H-index [resp. G-index] and σ is the side-output. In order to track the index of the current random oracle query, W maintains a counter , initially set to 1. It also maintains a table L H [resp. L G ] to manage the random oracle H [resp. G]. W initiates the EU-ID-CMA game by passing mpk as the challenge master public key to the adversary A. The queries by A are handled as per the following specifications.
(a) Random oracle query, H(R, id): L H contains tuples of the form
Here, (R, id) is the query to the H-oracle with c being the corresponding output. The index of the query is stored in the -field. Finally, the y-field stores either (a component of) the secret key for id, or a '⊥' in case the field is invalid. H(R, id) is fresh if there exists no
If such a tuple exists, then the oracle has to return c i as the output. A fresh, explicit, H-oracle query is handled as follows: i) return c := s as the output, and ii) add R, id, c, , ⊥ to L H and increment by one.
(b) Random oracle query, G(id, A, m): L G contains tuples of the form
Here, (id, A, m) is the query to the G-oracle with d being the corresponding output. The index of the query is stored in the -field. Therefore, a random oracle query G(id, A, m) is fresh if there exists no tuple (ii) Otherwise, W chooses y ∈ R Z p , sets c := s and R := (g α ) −c g y . It then adds R, id, c, , y 12 to L H and increments by one (an implicit H-oracle query). Finally, it returns usk := (y, R) as the secret key. 
. W now uses the knowledge of usk to run S and returns the signature. (ii) Otherwise, W generates usk as in step (ii) of Extract query and runs S to return the signature.
At the end of the simulation, a successful adversary outputs a valid forgeryσ := (Â,b,R) on a (îd,m). Let id j , R j , c j , j , y j be the tuple in L H that corresponds to the target H-query. Similarly, let m i , A i , c i , d i , i be the tuple in L G that corresponds to the target G-query. W returns ( i , j , (b, c j , d i ) ) as its own output. Note that the side-output σ consists of (b, c j , d i ).
Structure of the forgery. Recall that the signature queries are answered by doing an extract query on the identity followed by calling S . Therefore, the resultant secret keys are of the form usk = (y, R), where R = (g α ) −c g y and we have r = −αc + y. If a forgery is produced using the same R as given by R 2 as part of the signature query on id, then b will be of the form b = a + (−αc + y + αc)d = a + yd. Therefore, it will not contain the solution to the DLP challenge α, and such forgeries are of no use to R 2 . But the event ¬E guarantees that A does not forge using an R which was given as part of the signature query on id and hence, for the forgery to be valid b will necessarily be of the form b = a + (r + αc)d.
Correctness of the Discrete-Log.
In the event of successful forking, R 2 obtains two (related) sets of side-outputs {σ 0 , σ 1 }, where σ i (for i = 0, 1) is of the form (b i , c i , d i ). Letâ denote log gÂ1 = log gÂ0 ; letr denote log gR1 = Q 0 Since the multiple-forking was successful, we have: {b 0 = a + (r + αc 0 )d,b 1 =â + (r + αc 1 )d}-a system of two congruences in the two (effective) unknowns {â +rd, α}. α can be solved for by using the expression given below.
Notice that (12) is precisely what R 2 outputs in Algorithm 5.
Analysis
Since there is no abort involved in the simulation of the protocol, we may conclude that the accepting probability of W is the same as the advantage of the adversary, i.e. acc W = . The probability of success of the reduction R 2 is computed by using MF Lemma (Lemma 2) with q := q H + q G , |S| := p and n = 1. 13 Hence, we get 2 = O 2 /(q H + q G ) 2 .
Time complexity. Drawing analogy from the analysis of time complexity of R 1 , the time taken by R 2 is easily seen to be bounded by t 2 ≤ t + 2(2q ε + 3q s )τ .
Remark 4. R 2 is similar in some aspects to the (incomplete) reduction B 2 in [GG09] . However, a major difference is that R 2 uses the MF Algorithm M W ,1 instead of M W ,3 to solve the DLP challenge. Therefore, only one forking is involved leading to a much tighter reduction than B 2 .
Reduction R 3
Let ∆ := (G, p, g, g α ) be the given DLP instance. As in R 2 , the reduction involves invoking the MF Algorithm on the wrapper W . The only difference is that MF Algorithm is run for n = 3. As a result, it obtains a set of four congruences in four unknowns and solves for α. It can be verified that R 3 indeed returns the correct solution to the DLP instance.
Notice that (14) is precisely what R 3 outputs in Algorithm 6.
Analysis
Since there is no abort involved in the simulation of the protocol, we may conclude that the accepting probability of W is the same as the advantage of the adversary, i.e. acc W = . The probability of success of the reduction R 3 is computed by using MF Lemma (Lemma 2) with q := q H + q G , |S| := p and n = 3. Hence, we have 3 = O 4 /(q H + q G ) 6 .
A Comparison with the Original Reduction.
Recall that we replaced the reduction B 1 in the original security argument with the new reduction R 1 . Likewise, B 2 was replaced with the two reductions R 2 and R 3 . The resulting effect on tightness is tabulated below. The security degradation involved in original B 1 is of the order O q 3 G . In comparison, R 1 incurs a degradation of order O (q G q ε ) which is much lower than that of B 1 . Note that q G q ε , i.e. the bound on the number of random oracle queries is much greater than the bound on the number of extract queries. For example, for 80-bit security one usually assumes q G ≈ 2 60 while q ε ≈ 2 30 . The degradation involved in the original B 2 would be of the order of O (q G + q H ) 6 (as pointed out in Footnote 13). In comparison, the security degradation involved in R 2 and R 3 is of order O (q H + q G ) 2 and O (q H + q G ) 6 respectively. Thus, the effective degradation 14 is still of the order
Our new reductions Note that the factor in the denominator remains the same.
Conclusion
In this work we have identified certain shortcomings in the original security argument of the Galindo-Garcia IBS. Based on our observations we provide a new elaborate security argument for the same scheme. Two of the reductions are significantly tighter than their counterparts in the original security argument in [GG09] . However, all the reductions are still non-tight. We would like to pose the question of constructing an identity-based signature scheme in discretelog setting (without pairing) with a tighter security reduction as an interesting open research problem.
A Definitions
In this section, we give the formal definition of an IBS and describe the standard security model for an IBS. We also describe the discrete-log assumption, on which the Galindo-Garcia IBS is based on.
A.1 Identity-Based Signatures
Definition 1 (Identity-Based Signature). An IBS scheme consists of four polynomial-time, probabilistic algorithms {G , E , S , V } described below.
Set-up, G (κ): It takes as input the security parameter κ. It outputs the master secret key msk and the master public key mpk.
Key Extraction, E (id, msk): It takes as input the user's identity id, the master secret key msk to generate a secret key usk for the user.
Signing, S (id, m, usk): It takes as input the user's identity id, a message m and the user's secret key usk to generate a signature σ. 
A.2 Security Model
Goldwasser et al. [GMR88] defined the security notion for public-key signature (PKS) schemes as existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack (EU-CMA). The EU-ID-CMA model extends this notion to the identity-based setting. We use the detailed EU-ID-CMA model given by Bellare et al. in [BNN04] .
Definition 2 (EU-ID-CMA Game 15 ). The security of an IBS scheme in the EU-ID-CMA model is argued in terms of the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Set-up: C runs G to obtain the master public key mpk and the master secret key msk. It passes mpk as the challenge master public key to A.
Queries: A can adaptively make extract queries to an oracle O ε and signature queries to an oracle O s . These queries are handled as follows.
-Extract query, O ε (id): A asks for the secret key of a user with identity id. If there has already been an extract query on id, C returns the user secret key that was generated during the earlier query. Otherwise, C uses the knowledge of msk to run E and generate the user secret key usk, which is then passed on to A.
-Signature query, O s (id, m): A asks for the signature of a user with identity id on a message m. C first obtains, as specified the extract query, a user secret key usk corresponding to id. Next, it uses the knowledge of usk to run S and generate a signature σ, which is passed to A.
Forgery: A outputs a signatureσ on an identityîd and a messagem, and wins the game if the forgery is i) valid:σ passes the verification on (îd,m); and ii) non-trivial: A has not queried the extract oracle withîd, nor has it queried the signature oracle with (îd,m).
The advantage that A has in the above game, denoted by Adv
, is defined as the probability with which it wins the above game, i.e.
providedσ is a non-trivial forgery on (îd,m). An adversary A is said to be an ( , t, q ε , q s )-forger of an IBS scheme if it has advantage of at least in the above game, runs in time at most t and makes at most q ε [resp. q s ] extract [resp. signature] queries. Definition 4. Consider a group G of prime order p, generated by g. The discrete-log problem (DLP) in G is to find α given g α , where α ∈ R Z p . An adversary A has advantage in solving the DLP if Pr α = α | α ∈ R Z p ; α ← A(G, p, g, g α ) ≥ .
The ( , t)-discrete-log assumption holds in G if no adversary has advantage at least in solving the DLP in time at most t.
B The Fixed Security Argument
Let A be an adversary against GG-IBS in EU-ID-CMA model. Eventually, A outputs an attempted forgery of the form σ = (A, b, R). Let E be the event that σ is a valid signature and R was contained in an answer of the signature oracle O s . Let NE be the event that σ is a valid signature and R was never part of an answer of O s . Galindo and Garcia construct algorithms B 1 [resp. B 2 ] that break the DLP in case of event E [resp. NE]. We describe the modified reductions below.
B.1 Reduction B 1 B 1 takes as argument the description of a group (G, p, g) and a challenge g α with α ∈ R Z p and tries to extract the discrete logarithm α. The environment is simulated as shown below. B 1 .1 B 1 picksî ∈ R {1, . . . , q G }, 16 where q G is the maximum number of queries that the adversary A makes to the G-oracle. Letîd (the target identity) be theî th distinct identity queried to the G-oracle. Next, B 1 chooses z ∈ R Z p and sets (mpk, msk) := ((G, g, p, G, H, g z ), z), where G, H are descriptions of hash functions modelled as random oracles. As usual, B 1 simulates these oracles with the help of two tables L G and L H containing the queried values along with the answers given to A. B 1 .2 Every time A queries the key extraction oracle O ε , for user id, B 1 chooses c, y ∈ R Z p , sets R := g −zc g y and adds R, id, c to the table L H . Then it returns the key (y, R) to A. B 1 .5 B 1 invokes the algorithm M W ,1 (mpk) as described in Lemma 1 ( §4 in [GG09] ). Here algorithm W is simply a wrapper that takes as explicit input, the answers from the random oracles. Then it calls A and returns its output together with two integers I, J. These integers are the indices of A's queries to the random oracles G, H with the target identitŷ id. . If the identity id is not equal to the target identitŷ id then B 1 aborts. Otherwise it terminates and outputs the attempted discrete logarithm
B.2 Reduction B 2
It takes as argument, the description of a group (G, p, g) and a challenge g α with α ∈ R Z p and outputs the discrete logarithm α. To do so, it will invoke A simulating the environment as shown below.
B 2 .1 At the beginning of the experiment, B 2 sets the master public key mpk:=(G, p, g, G, H) and msk := (g α ), where G, H are description of hash functions modelled as random oracles. As usual, B 2 simulates these oracles with the help of two tables L G and L H containing the queried values together with the answers given to A. B 2 .2 Every time A queries the key extraction oracle O ε , for user id, B 2 chooses c, y ∈ R Z p , sets R := g −αc g y and adds R, id, c to the table L H . Then it returns the key (y, R) to A. B 2 .3 When A queries the signature oracle O s with (id, m), B 2 simply computes id's secret key as described in the previous step. Then it computes a signature by calling S , adding the respective call to the G-oracle, ((id, g a , m), d) to the table L G and gives the resulting signature to the adversary.
B 2 .4 B 2 invokes the algorithm M W ,3 (mpk). In this way either B 2 aborts prematurely or we get, for some identity id, some message m and some R, four forgeries (id, m, (A k , b k , R k )), k := 0, . . . , 3. Now, two situations may arise (a) If R 3 = R 2 = R 1 = R 0 (H < G) then, the signatures will be of the form {b 0 = log A 0 + (log R + c 0 α)d 0 , b 1 = log A 0 + (log R + c 0 α)d 1 , b 2 = log A 2 + (log R + c 2 α)d 2 , b 3 = log A 2 + (log R + c 2 α)d 3 }
B 2 solves for α using the equation 
